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Abstract
We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default
reduces shareholder-debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and
take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a
large panel of firms in 41 countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics.
Consistent with our model, we find that the relation between debt enforcement and firms’
investment and risk depends on the firm-specific probability of default. A differences-
in-differences analysis of firms’ investment and risk taking in response to bankruptcy
reforms that make debt more renegotiable confirms the cross-country evidence.
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1. Introduction
A central result in corporate finance is that, as firms approach financial distress, key
corporate decisions such as investment and risk taking get distorted by conflicts of interests
between shareholders and creditors. Notably, the expectation of a low shareholder recovery in
distress may lead shareholders in financially distressed firms to reject positive net present value
(NPV) projects or to sell assets in place—the underinvestment effect of Myers (1977)—and
to take on too much risk—the risk-shifting effect of Jensen and Meckling (1976).
The goal of this paper is to examine whether the enforcement of debt contracts in default
affects the underinvestment and risk-shifting distortions caused by risky debt and shareholder-
debtholder conflicts. To obtain empirical predictions relating debt enforcement to investment
and risk choices, we develop a simple model of endogenous investment, asset sales, and risk
taking in which debt enforcement affects the payoff to shareholders in default and, hence,
corporate decisions close to default. The model synthesizes the theories of underinvestment
(Myers, 1977), risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and debt enforcement in default (Fan
and Sundaresan, 2000). In the model, a firm operates risky assets and has risky, long-term
debt outstanding. Management maximizes shareholder value and can make three decisions.
First, it can invest in new assets. Second, it can reduce the scale of the firm by selling part of
its assets before debt maturity. Third, it can change the risk of assets in place.
Using this model, we show that bankruptcy codes that favor debt enforcement decrease
shareholders’ expected recovery in default and, hence, the benefits of investment to sharehold-
ers. This mechanism implies that the distortions in investment and asset sales due to risky
debt increase with debt enforcement in default and leads to the prediction that the effects of
the default probability on investment decisions should be higher in countries with stricter debt
enforcement. Additionally, we show that the prospect of a strict enforcement of debt contracts
in default increases the convexity of shareholders’ claim by decreasing their expected payoff
in default. This leads to the prediction that the sensitivity of risk taking to the probability
of default increases in countries with stricter debt enforcement.
We test these predictions using a panel of 18,602 firms in 41 countries with heteroge-
neous bankruptcy procedures, exploiting the cross-country variation in debt enforcement doc-
umented in the survey by Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (DHMS, 2008). This survey
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shows that bankruptcy procedures vary substantially across countries and that an important
source of heterogeneity is the amount of provisions for debt enforcement in default. In our
empirical analysis, we construct a debt enforcement index with information from the DHMS
survey and use this index to measure international variation in debt enforcement and share-
holders’ expected recovery in default. Because distortions in corporate policies are more likely
when firms approach financial distress, our tests relate investment and risk to the interaction
between the index of debt enforcement and firm-specific measures of default risk.
Our empirical analysis delivers three main results. First, distressed firms in countries
with strict debt enforcement invest less than equally distressed firms in countries with weaker
debt enforcement procedures. Notably, firms with a default probability higher than the third
quartile breakpoint in countries where debt contracts are most likely to be enforced (where
the Debt enforcement index has the maximum value of one) have an investment-to-assets ratio
that is about 14% lower than similar firms in countries where debt contracts are least likely to
be enforced (where the Debt enforcement index equals zero). Second, distressed firms’ assets
grow significantly less in countries where debt contracts are strictly enforced. On average,
their asset growth rate is 79% smaller than that of distressed firms in a country with the
weakest debt enforcement. Finally, distressed firms in countries where debt enforcement is
strict are about 37% riskier, measured by total equity volatility, than similar firms in countries
where debt enforcement is weaker.
The main challenge of our empirical analysis is that firms are not randomly assigned to dif-
ferent bankruptcy procedures. The utmost concern is that a country’s bankruptcy procedure
may be correlated with observable and unobservable country characteristics that are likely to
affect firms’ ability to invest or undertake risk through channels other than the enforceability
of debt contracts. Our empirical framework attempts to control for such confounding effects
by including time-varying firm and country characteristics, as well as country or firm fixed
effects. The inclusion of country or firm fixed effects mitigates the concern that other unob-
served country-specific factors may correlate with creditors’ ability to enforce debt contracts.
In addition, since firms close to distress are those that are most likely to be influenced by
the bankruptcy procedures, our tests are conducted by exploiting firms’ heterogeneity in their
probability of facing financial distress.
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To strengthen the interpretation of the results, we also implement a differences-in-differences
analysis around two sets of bankruptcy reforms that targeted the renegotiability of debt and,
therefore, debt enforcement. The goal of this analysis is to validate our cross-country results
in a setting that, by design, reduces the concern that our results may be driven by potential
effects of unobserved country characteristics. In a first step, we explore the effects of three
major bankruptcy reforms in France, Italy, and Brazil in 2005 that made debtor-initiated
renegotiations easier (see Weber, 2005; Rodano, Serrano-Velarde, and Tarantino, 2016; Alen-
car and Ponticelli, 2016). In a second step, we focus on the 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Reform
Act, which had a major impact on distressed reorganizations under Chapter 11. This reform
was designed to encourage debt renegotiation, by shifting bargaining power in reorganizations
towards shareholders (see Hackbarth, Haselmann, and Schoenherr, 2015). In all cases, we
compare investment, asset growth, and risk of firms with a high default probability around
each bankruptcy reform to firms with a low default probability. Consistent with the cross-
country evidence, we find that high default probability firms invest relatively more and take
on relatively less risk after the implementation of a reform than low default probability firms.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the real effects of debt enforcement. A recent
strand of this literature shows that bankruptcy codes with fewer renegotiation frictions lead
to larger debt reductions and reduce equity risk (see Fan and Sundaresan, 2000; François and
Morellec, 2004; or Davydenko and Strebulaev, 2007). Consistent with this view, deviations
from absolute priority caused by debtor-friendly bankruptcy codes have been shown to have
important effects on equity returns both in the U.S. (see Garlappi, Shu, and Yan, 2008;
Garlappi and Yan, 2011; and Hackbarth, Haselmann, and Schoenherr, 2015) and outside the
U.S. (see Favara, Schroth, and Valta, 2012). While these studies assume that asset risk is given
and independent of claimholders’ expected recovery in default, we show that the prospect of an
imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces asset risk. Therefore, our analysis
suggests that the equity risk effects found in prior studies may not only be due to a leverage
(i.e., capital structure) effect but also due to a risk-shifting effect.
Our paper also relates to the literature on agency conflicts and risk-shifting [see, for ex-
ample, the recent empirical studies by Eisdorfer (2008), Gormley and Matsa (2011), Landier,
Sraer, and Thesmar (2015)]. While risk-shifting incentives increase with the probability of dis-
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tress, this literature has so far ignored the effects of bankruptcy law on risk taking. The paper
closest to ours in this literature is Becker and Stromberg (2012). Becker and Stromberg show
that a strengthening of managerial fiduciary duties to creditors mitigates underinvestment and
risk-shifting incentives for firms near insolvency. Our study shows that underinvestment and
risk-shifting distortions are also mitigated if debt enforcement is imperfect and shareholders
expect a higher recovery on the assets in default. Because weaker debt enforcement in default
in fact may increase the payoffs to both shareholders and creditors by reducing default costs
[as shown, for example, in Fan and Sundaresan (2000)], the findings in these two studies sug-
gest that legal institutions can improve overall welfare near default by aligning shareholders’
incentives with creditors’ interests.
A parallel literature studies the role of private arrangements to mitigate reorganization or
liquidation biases of bankruptcy laws. For example, Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) argue that,
when creditor protection is high, efficient resolutions of financial distress can be achieved by
writing private contracts that allocate control rights to shareholders and creditors over reorga-
nization and liquidation decisions. Our results suggest that even if such private arrangements
exist, they cannot offset completely bankruptcy codes’ distortions, which is consistent with
the evidence in Lerner and Schoar (2005) that contractual provisions provide only a partial
solution to legal enforcement problems. Even so, our analysis does not rely on the assumption
that debtors and creditors cannot write state-contingent contracts. It only requires that some
contracting frictions prevent parties to write contracts that Pareto improve their welfare, for
example, because such contracts cannot be perfectly enforced in court.
Our paper also contributes to the large empirical literature that studies the impact of
creditor rights on firms’ debt capacity and investment. While there is widespread evidence
that a strengthening of creditor protection improves firms’ access to finance (see, e.g., La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008), an improvement in creditor rights may also have
adverse effects on firms. For example, Acharya, Sundaram, and John (2011) show that corpo-
rations reduce leverage in response to stronger creditor rights to avoid inefficient liquidation
in bankruptcy. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) find that away from distress, firms’ invest-
ment decisions may be biased towards safer projects to mitigate creditors’ liquidation biases.
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von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, and Visaria (2012) and Vig (2013) show that a strengthening
of creditor rights may reduce debtors’ welfare, even if the supply of credit increases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and derives testable
predictions. Section 3 describes the data and discusses our index of debt enforcement and
the measures for investment, asset sales, and firm risk. Section 4 presents our main empirical
results. Section 5 implements a difference-in-differences analysis around a few bankruptcy
reforms that weaken the ability of creditors to enforce debt payments. Section 6 presents
robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Debt enforcement, investment, and asset sales
This section presents a simple model that illustrates the effects of debt enforcement in
default on shareholder-debtholder conflicts and investment and risk choices. To do so, we
consider a two-period version of the Fan and Sundaresan (2000) model that we augment with
investment decisions.1 Specifically, we consider a firm with assets in place and risky debt
outstanding. The value of assets at time t is denoted by Vt. The return on the firm’s assets
is governed by a binomial process, so that in each period the asset value can increase by a
factor z > 1 with (risk-neutral) probability p = 1−z
−1
z−z−1 or decrease by a factor z
−1 < 1 with
probability 1− p, where we assume for simplicity that the risk-free rate is zero. In addition to
its assets in place, the firm has a growth option that, if undertaken, increases asset value by
a factor g from Vt to Vt(1 + g). The cost of investment is I > 0, to be paid by shareholders at
time t = 0. The investment pays off at t = 2 when the asset value V2 can take three values:
z2V0, V0, and z
−2V0. These assumptions imply that the increase in firm value from investment
is given by
E[gV2] = p2gz2V0 + 2p (1− p) gV0 + (1− p)2 gz−2V0 = gV0, (1)
1While our results do not depend on the number of periods, we need at least two periods to have three
states on the final date, allowing us to examine the effects of default risk on investment and risk choices.
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showing that, without risky debt, it is optimal for shareholders to invest if V0 ≥ Ig .
The firm has risky debt outstanding with promised payment D at time t = 2. To examine
the effects of risky debt and default risk on investment, we consider two alternative scenarios.
In the first scenario, which we call “low leverage scenario,”we assume that D = D with
V0 > D > (1 + g) z
−2V0,
so that the firm only defaults in the bottom most node of the tree, with probability (1− p)2.
In the second scenario, which we call “high leverage scenario,”we assume that D = D with
z2V0 > D > (1 + g)V0,
so that the firm defaults in the two lowest nodes, with probability 2p (1− p) + (1− p)2.
Suppose first that creditor rights are perfectly enforced in default so that debtholders get
all of the firm’s assets in default. In the high leverage scenario, the default probability is
2p (1− p) + (1− p)2 and shareholders invest if gp2z2V0 > I or if
V0 ≥ V ≡
I
gp2z2
=
(
z − z−1
z − 1
)2
I
g
>
I
g
.
In the low leverage scenario, the default probability is (1− p)2 and shareholders invest if
V0 ≥ V ≡
I
g [p2z2 + 2p (1− p)]
=
I
g
[
1− (1− p)2 z−2
] > I
g
.
Since p ∈ (0, 1) and z > 1, we have V > V > I
g
. It follows that with risky debt and perfect
enforcement of debt obligations in default there is underinvestment, as shareholders do not
invest when either V0 ∈ [I/g, V ) (in the low leverage scenario) or V0 ∈
[
I/g, V
)
(in the high
leverage scenario). Indeed, in such instances, the NPV of the growth option is less than the
potential wealth transfer to debtholders.2 In addition, underinvestment increases with the
probability of default, as shown by the ordering of the investment thresholds.
2To see why, suppose we are in the low leverage scenario and V0 =
I
g . In this case, the NPV of the project
to the firm is zero but debt value increases by (1− p)2gz−2V0 following investment, implying that the wealth
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Suppose now that debt can be renegotiated in default due to imperfect debt enforcement
and that shareholders can appropriate a fraction 1− η of firm value, where η ∈ [0, 1] captures
debt enforcement in default. When η = 1, creditor rights are perfectly enforced implying that
shareholders get nothing in default. When η < 1, debt enforcement is imperfect, leading to a
positive payoff to shareholders in default. We show below that variation in debt enforcement
should lead to variation in investment and risk taking.
To see this, note that in the high leverage scenario, the probability of default is again
2p (1− p) + (1− p)2 but shareholders invest if
V0 ≥ V R(η) ≡
I
g
[
p2z2 + 2p (1− p) (1− η) + (1− p)2 (1− η)z−2
] . (2)
In the low leverage scenario, the default probability is again (1− p)2 but shareholders invest
if
V0 ≥ V R(η) ≡
I
g
[
p2z2 + 2p (1− p) + (1− p)2 (1− η)z−2
] . (3)
Eq. (2) and (3) show that shareholders’ investment behavior reflects their expected recov-
ery in default, which depends on debt enforcement. Because η ∈ [0, 1] and z > 1, we have
I
g
≤ V R(η) ≤ V R(η), with strict inequalities when η < 1. That is, shareholders’ incentives
to invest decrease with the probability of default, as shareholders do not invest when either
V0 ∈ [I/g, V R(η)) (in the low leverage scenario) or V0 ∈
[
I/g, V R(η)
)
(in the high leverage
scenario). Eq. (2) and (3) also show that we have V R(η) < V and V R(η) < V when η < 1 so
that imperfect debt enforcement mitigates underinvestment incentives. Lastly, when η = 0,
we have V R(0) = V R(0) =
I
g
so that there is no underinvestment. Our model therefore re-
produces Myers’s (1977) main result that firms may reject positive NPV projects whenever
some of the benefits of new investment accrue to debtholders by increasing the value of risky
debt. Specifically, for underinvestment to arise, we need the default probability to be positive
of shareholders decreases by the same amount if the firm invests. When V0 ∈ [I/g, V ), the NPV of investment
is positive for the firm but negative for shareholders. When V0 = V , the NPV of investment is positive for the
firm and zero for shareholders. When V0 > V , the NPV of investment is positive for the firm and shareholders.
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(necessary condition) and the wealth transfer to debtholders to increase the project’s NPV
(sufficient condition). The latter condition is satisfied if V0 < V R(η) in the low leverage sce-
nario and if V0 < V R(η) in the high leverage scenario. Our model adds, however, to Myers’
predictions by showing that underinvestment distortions are mitigated when debt enforcement
in default is imperfect.
Importantly, simple calculations also show that:
∂(V R(η)/V R(η))
∂η
=
2z(1 + z)2
((1 + z)2 − (1 + 2z)η)2
> 0
∂((I/(g(1− η))/V R(η))
∂η
=
z(z + 2)
(1 + z)2(1− η)2
> 0
∂((I/(g(1− η))/V R(η))
∂η
=
z2
(1 + z)2(1− η)2
> 0
where I/(g(1 − η)) is the investment threshold when the firm defaults with probability 1 at
time t = 2 and the ratio V R(η)/V R(η) measures the change in the investment threshold due
to a change in the default probability when moving from the low leverage scenario to the
high leverage scenario for a given η. These relations imply that the effect of the firm-specific
default probability on investment incentives increases with the degree of debt enforcement.
When there is no default risk, shareholders invest if V0 ≥ Ig and debt enforcement has no
bearing on investment.3
Summarizing, our simple model shows that (1) firms with a positive default probability
may reject positive NPV projects; (2) the effect of the default probability on investment
incentives increases with debt enforcement; (3) debt enforcement does not affect investment
for firms with zero default probability.
3When measuring the effect of debt enforcement on the relation between investment incentives and the
default probability starting from a scenario in which debt is risk-free, we also have
∂(V R(η)/(I/g))
∂η
> 0,
∂(V R(η)/(I/g))
∂η
> 0 and
∂((I/(g(1− η))/(I/g))
∂η
> 0,
showing here again that the effect of the firm-specific default probability on investment incentives increases
with the degree of debt enforcement.
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So far, we have examined the effects of debt enforcement on shareholders’ incentives to
acquire new assets. Debt enforcement is also important for asset sales. Suppose indeed that
the firm can sell a fraction θ of its assets at time t = 0 for a price S and that D = D (similar
arguments can be made if D = D). The firm will sell the asset if S > S(η) where
S(η) ≡ θ{p2
[
(1 + g)z2V0 −D
]
+ 2p (1− p) [(1 + g)V0 −D] + (1− p)2 (1−η)(1 +g)z−2V0},
where the right-hand side of this equation represents a fraction θ of the cash flows accruing to
shareholders. It is immediate to see that the minimum price S(η) that leads the firm to sell its
assets decreases with debt enforcement and with the default probability. That is, shareholders’
incentives to sell assets are distorted by risky debt because of the value that is transferred to
debtholders when the firm is in default. This is another form of underinvestment.
2.2. Debt enforcement and risk-shifting
Suppose now that shareholders can increase risk just after investing in the project, i.e., en-
gage in asset substitution.4 When leverage is low and debt enforcement in default is imperfect,
equity value just after investment is given by:
E(V0;D) = p
2
[
(1 + g)z2V0 −D
]
+2p (1− p) [(1 + g)V0 −D]+(1− p)2 (1− η) (1+g)z−2V0.
An increase in z corresponds to an increase in the possible spread of values for the project and,
therefore, in project risk. Using the definition of the risk-neutral probability of an increase in
asset value, we have that:
∂E(V0;D)
∂z
=
2 [Dz + η(1 + g)V0]
(1 + z)3
> 0, (4)
in the low leverage case so that:
∂2E(V0;D)
∂z∂η
=
2(1 + g)V0
(1 + z)3
> 0. (5)
4Risk-shifting can also be analyzed in closed-form in the case of a firm without a growth option, with the
same results and empirical implications. See Appendix C for details.
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Eq. (4) shows that, for firms with a positive default probability, shareholders have incentives
to increase risk after debt has been issued, a result first uncovered by Jensen and Meckling
(1976). This is due to the fact that shareholders own an option to default and that the value of
this option increases with asset risk. Eq. (5) shows that by decreasing shareholders’ expected
recovery in default, stronger debt enforcement increases the convexity of the option payoff
and makes it more attractive for shareholders to increase risk. Lastly, simple calculations also
show that we have
∂2E(V0;D)
∂z∂η
=
2(1 + g)zV0
(1 + z)3
> 0,
in the high leverage case so that
∂2E(V0;D)
∂z∂η
∂2E(V0;D)
∂z∂η
=
2(1+g)zV0
(1+z)3
2(1+g)V0
(1+z)3
= z > 1.
That is, debt enforcement has a greater effect on risk taking when default risk is larger. Lastly,
when D is low enough that there is no default risk, equity value after investment is given by
E(V0;D) = (1 + g)V0 −D and debt enforcement has no effect on risk taking.
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we summarize below our testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Investment in leveraged firms subject to default risk should decrease with the
firm-specific default probability. The effect of the default probability on investment should be
stronger in countries with stricter debt enforcement.
Hypothesis 2: Risk in leveraged firms subject to default risk should increase with the firm-
specific default probability. The effect of the default probability on risk should be stronger in
countries with stricter debt enforcement.
3. Data and empirical method
3.1. Data
Our sample covers 41 countries for the period 2000–2010. We collect accounting data in
U.S. Dollars from Worldscope and Capital IQ, and stock price data in U.S. Dollars from the
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Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) (for U.S. firms) and Datastream (for the rest
of the world). We exclude financial services firms (first Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
code digit equal to six), utility firms (first two SIC code digits equal to 49), and government-
related firms (first SIC code digit equal to 9). We winsorize the variables in our sample at
the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize the effects of outliers or coding errors in Worldscope,
Capital IQ, and Datastream. The final sample consists of 18,602 firms.
Data about debt enforcement come from Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (DHMS,
2008). Other country-specific variables are from the World Bank databases. Appendix A
provides a description of the data collection. Table 1 contains the definitions of the variables
in the data set.
Insert Table 1 Here
3.1.1. Debt enforcement
In the model, a high value of η reflects a stricter enforcement of debt contracts via provi-
sions in the bankruptcy procedure that make a successful debt renegotiation in or out-of-court
less likely. We measure debt enforcement using the data from the DHMS international survey
on debt enforcement procedures. In this survey, attorneys and judges who practice bankruptcy
law in 88 countries are asked to describe how an identical case of a firm defaulting on its debt
is treated. Based on these responses, DHMS report country-specific measures of the quality
of debt enforcement, some of which form the basis of our analysis.
Specifically, we follow Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012) and define Debt enforcement as
the average of 16 binary indicators (zero if no, one if yes) that are likely to strengthen the
enforcement of debt contracts in default, mainly via frictions against renegotiations. These
indicators include the rights of creditors to seize and sell firm collateral without court ap-
proval; to enforce their claims in an out-of-court procedure; to approve the appointment of an
insolvency administrator and dismiss it; and to vote directly on the reorganization plan of a
defaulting firm. The index also includes information on whether an insolvency procedure can-
not be appealed and whether management is automatically dismissed during the resolution of
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the insolvency procedure. As a result, this index captures impediments to shareholders’ ability
to renege on outstanding debt, whether through a formal insolvency procedure or outside of
court. By construction, the Debt enforcement index ranges from zero to one: the higher the
score, the stricter debt enforcement and the less likely shareholders will be able to renegotiate
debt in default. A detailed description of this index is provided in Appendix B.1.
Insert Table 2 Here
As in Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012), we impute the DHMS survey results from 2005
to all the years in our sample (2000–2010), assuming that the survey captures the essence
of each country’s approach to insolvency, which is deeply rooted in persistent economical,
political, and societal values. We explore the validity of this assumption in Section 5, where
we track all major changes to each country’s bankruptcy code in our sample period. While
such changes are rare, we conduct in Section 5 a difference-in-differences analysis of firms’
behavior around the few cases where the country’s bankruptcy code reform changes debt
enforcement by making it easier to renegotiate debt.5
Table 2 shows that the average value of the Debt enforcement index in our sample is 0.54,
with a standard deviation of 0.25. The majority of countries in the sample are concentrated
around values of 0.45 and 0.58, including Japan and the U.S. According to the Debt enforce-
ment index, debt is expected to be enforced relatively weakly in countries with a French origin
of the legal system, e.g., France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Conversely, debt enforcement is
stricter in, e.g., Austria, Finland, or Hungary, as well as Thailand or Turkey. Table 2 also
shows that the number of firms varies substantially across countries, with U.S. and Japanese
firms respectively accounting for 16% and 12.6% of the sample observations. We show below
that our results continue to hold when we exclude U.S. and Japanese firms from the sample.
5Bankruptcy law reforms until 2004 are tracked by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), and by the
World Bank (www.doingbusiness.org). Within our ten-year sample period, the only major changes in the
bankruptcy code that explicitly affected the renegotiability of debt are in France (2005), Brazil (2005), and Italy
(2005). Major bankruptcy reforms in Russia (2004) and Spain (2004) are not focused on debt renegotiability.
Japan also changed its bankruptcy code in 2000, but the changes were undone in 2002.
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3.1.2. Default probability
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders, and hence underinvestment and
risk-shifting distortions, are most prevalent when a firm has risky debt and when there is a
significant probability that the firm will default on its debt obligations. To measure the default
probability, we rely on the näıve default probability measure of Bharath and Shumway (2008),
which is an approximation of the Merton (1974) model.6 Bharath and Shumway (2008) show
that the näıve default probability performs better at predicting default than the actual Merton
(1974) model probability. Moreover, the näıve default probability can be easily computed for
our large international panel of firms because it does not rely on credit ratings data. Table 2
shows that the default probability varies significantly within and across countries.
3.1.3. Investment, asset growth, and risk
We study the relation between the default probability, its interaction with debt enforce-
ment, and three main outcome variables: Investment, asset sales, and risk. We measure
Investment as capital expenditures in year t divided by total assets in year t− 1. The average
investment rate is 5.6% with a standard deviation of 0.070.
Because capital expenditures are truncated at zero, they are not informative about whether
the firm is selling or buying assets. We use Asset growth as an alternative measure of invest-
ment because it can take negative values and, therefore, includes asset sales. We define Asset
growth as the growth in total assets from year t−1 to year t. In the sample, the average asset
growth rate is 9.2% with a standard deviation of 0.257.7
6The näıve default probability approximates the functional form of the Merton default probability, but
simplifies the computation of the variables needed as inputs. The two main simplifications are: 1) the expected
return on the firm’s assets is measured by the firm’s stock return over the previous year; 2) total asset volatility
is measured as a weighted average of the book debt and market equity volatilities. See Bharath and Shumway
(2008, p. 1347) for further details.
7Alternative approaches to measure asset sales in the literature include the uses of keyword searches for
‘asset,’ ‘sale,’ and ‘divestiture’ within 8K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Lang,
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To measure risk, we use three proxies based on the market price of equity. The first
risk measure, Equity vol, is equal to the annualized standard deviation of weekly stock returns
(Friday-to-Friday) in year t as in Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2012).8 The second risk measure,
Idiosyncratic vol, uses idiosyncratic stock return volatility. For every firm in the sample, we
regress a firm’s weekly stock returns in year t on the lagged, contemporaneous, and lead world
market index return and compute Idiosyncratic vol as the annualized standard deviation of
the residuals. This measure allows us to test whether shareholders control systematic or
idiosyncratic equity volatility in their attempt to increase risk.9 The third risk measure, Asset
vol, is computed as in Bharath and Shumway (2008) as the average of the annual equity
and debt volatilities, weighted by the market equity and debt face values. We also use a
risk measure based on accounting information. Notably, following John, Litov, and Yeung
(2008), we compute the volatility of the ratio of Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization (EBITDA) to assets over eight years, between years t and t − 7, requiring
at least five available observations. While EBITDA-to-assets vol is a widely used measure
of asset risk, it is clearly backward-looking and may not capture the risk associated with
shareholders’ operational or investment choices.
Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995), reductions in the number of industry segments per firm reported in Compustat
(Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002), divestiture data from Securities Data Company (SDC) (Schlinge-
mann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002) and plant-level data (Yang, 2008). The data required to implement these
approaches in our international cross-section are unavailable.
8Some stocks in our sample are not frequently traded. Hence, by computing returns based on weekly data,
these stocks have zero returns. This computation could bias downwards our volatility estimates. To address
this issue, we exclude from the sample all firms with high proportions of zero stock returns. The current
sample uses a cutoff of 90%, but the results are robust to lower cutoff levels. The results are also robust to
using returns and volatilities based on daily stock prices.
9Chen, Strebulaev, Xing, and Zhang (2014) show that idiosyncratic volatility is the best predictor of future
stock returns among all the components of total asset volatility. Their interpretation is that, given the choice,
shareholders prefer to increase idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk because the latter reduces the stock
value and the former does not carry downside market risk.
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3.1.4. Other firm- and country-level control variables
Table 3 summarizes all the control variables used in the analysis. For the majority of
the variables in the data set, the variation is mostly between rather than within firms. This
feature of the data is not surprising for some variables, such as leverage, which are known to
have large permanent components (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008). Other variables,
such as Default probability and Asset growth, exhibit larger within-firm variation.
Insert Table 3 Here
3.2. Empirical method
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following regression model:
Dependent variablei,j,c,t (6)
= β0 + βD × Default probabilityi,j,c,t−1 + βη × Debt enforcementc
+ βDη × Default probabilityi,j,c,t−1 ×
(
Debt enforcementc − De
)
+ δt + βControl ×Controlsi,j,c,t−1 + ui,j,c,t.
In Eq. (6), the dependent variable is either Investment, Asset growth, or one of the risk
measures. We use the subscripts i for firms, j for industries, c for countries, and t for years.
Default probabilityi,j,c,t−1 is the lagged default probability, Debt enforcementc is the country-
specific measure of debt enforcement, and De is its sample mean. Controlsi,j,c,t−1 is a set of
predetermined firm and country characteristics that are likely to affect our dependent vari-
ables. We control for firms’ growth opportunities with the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-
book ratio), for the available cash flow (Cash flow-to-assets ratio), for size (log(Total assets)),
and for profitability (EBITDA-to-assets). We also include country-level cyclical factors influ-
encing investment, growth opportunities, and risk, such as the log of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita, GDP growth, and Stockmarket cap to GDP. We include year fixed effects
(δt) to control for time-varying factors common to all firms. We cluster standard errors at the
country level.
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According to Hypotheses 1 and 2, the main parameters of interest in our empirical anal-
ysis are βD and βDη. The parameter βD measures the association between the firm’s default
probability and the dependent variable evaluated at the sample mean of Debt enforcementc.
We expect βD to be negative for investment and asset growth, and positive for risk. βDη mea-
sures, instead, how the relation between a firm’s investment or risk and its default probability
vary with the country-specific measure of debt enforcement. We expect this parameter to be
negative for the investment and asset growth regressions and positive for the risk regressions.
Our benchmark regression model is estimated with either country and industry fixed effects
or firm fixed effects. These fixed effects absorb time-invariant differences across industries and
countries or firms, and minimize the concern that other unobserved factors may drive the
results. For example, country fixed effects account for other time-invariant country-specific
factors, such as the efficiency of the judicial system or the rule of law. Firm fixed effects
mitigate the concern that unobserved firm-level attributes, provided they are time-invarying,
affect the firms’ default probability as well as their investment and risk decisions. Adding these
fixed effects causes the country-specific Debt enforcementc variable to drop out. Our model
predicts that this variable’s coefficient, βη, should be zero when the firm’s probability of default
is zero. We test this additional implication as a robustness test in a pooled Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression, with the caveat that the OLS estimate of βη might also capture the
effect of other unobservable country characteristics, unrelated to debt enforcement.
4. Results
4.1. Investment
Table 4 presents the main results for investment. Our main interest is on the coefficients of
Default probability and the interaction term Default probability × Debt enforcement. Columns
1 and 2 show the estimates for our benchmark specification with industry and country, or firm
fixed effects, respectively.
Insert Table 4 Here
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As predicted, both Default probability and its interaction with Debt enforcement correlate
negatively and significantly with investment rates.10 To evaluate the economic significance
of our estimates, we compute the implied difference between the expected investment rates
of firms that are similar, given our control variables, but operate in countries with different
values of the Debt enforcement index. We evaluate the statistic
∆E(Investment) ≡ E(Investment |η0, .)− E(Investment |η1, .)
= β̂η × (η0 − η1)+
β̂Dη × (Default probability0 × η0 − Default probability1 × η1).
(7)
In this equation, η0 and η1 are any two given values of the Debt enforcement index. Default
probability i is the average default probability for all firms with a default probability higher
than the third quartile breakpoint in countries where η = ηi. Table 4 reports this statistic,
comparing countries where debt enforcement is weakest (η0 = 0, say China) and strongest
(η1 = 1, say Australia). Accounting for unobservable industry and country or firm fixed
effects, the differences exceed 14% of the average investment ratio.11
Column 3 reports the results of a pooled OLS regression. This regression allows us to
measure the correlation between Debt enforcement and investment when the probability of
default is zero. As shown, Debt enforcement does not correlate with investment directly, but
only via its interaction with Default probability. This finding reassures us that our index of debt
enforcement does not proxy for other country characteristics that affect investment and are
unrelated to shareholders’ expected recovery in default. If this were the case, Debt enforcement
could also be correlated with investment unconditionally of firms’ default probabilities.
Lastly, Erickson and Whited (2000) show that the error in the market-to-book ratio (‘av-
10The coefficients of the control variables have the expected sign. While predetermined, some of the
control variables used in all our specifications are endogenous, though standard in the corporate finance
and investment literature. The estimated coefficient of the interaction between Default probability and Debt
enforcement actually increases if we exclude these control variables (not reported).
11The stability of the interaction effects in columns 1 and 2 suggests that unobservable factors correlated
with country or firm fixed effects are unlikely to bias our results.
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erage Q ’) as a proxy for marginal q may bias the estimates in the investment regressions.
Following Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014), we use the fifth-order linear cumulants esti-
mator assuming measurement error in Market-to-book ratio and Cash flow-to-assets. Column
4 shows that our results are robust to this correction.12
Overall, the results in Table 4 show that, even after controlling for observable firm and
country characteristics and for unobservable fixed differences in investment across industries,
countries, and firms, investment ratios among the relatively more distressed firms are signifi-
cantly lower in countries where the bankruptcy procedure favors strict debt enforcement.
Becker and Stromberg (2012) estimate that a 1991 Delaware bankruptcy ruling, which
established stronger managerial fiduciary duties towards creditors, increased investment for
firms close to insolvency. They interpret this finding as evidence that a transfer of control rights
from debtors to creditors mitigates the distortions due to debt overhang. Our results suggest
that increasing shareholders’ expected recovery in default may also mitigate the distortions
caused by risky debt. Because imperfect debt enforcement in default in fact may increase
the cash flow to both shareholders and creditors by reducing default costs,13 the findings in
these two studies suggest that legal institutions can improve efficiency near default by aligning
shareholders’ incentives with creditors’ interests.
4.2. Asset growth
We use asset growth as an alternative measure of investment that is also indicative of asset
sales, and estimate the same specifications as before, but with Asset growth as a dependent
12Our results are also robust up to the eighth-order estimator, or to allowing for measurement error in
average Q (Market-to-book), profitability (EBITDA-to-assets), and the probability of default (DP).
13Fan and Sundaresan (2000), François and Morellec (2004), and Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) show,
for example, that this is the case if liquidation entails costs, and an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts
allows the firm to avoid costly liquidation. There exists a large empirical literature documenting significant
liquidation costs both in the U.S. (see, e.g., Warner, 1977; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Davydenko, Strebulaev,
and Zhao, 2012; or Glover, 2016) and outside the U.S. (see, e.g., Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011).
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variable. Table 5 presents the results.
Insert Table 5 Here
Columns 1 and 2 show that Asset growth and Default probability are on average negatively
correlated across countries. Moreover, asset growth is significantly lower for distressed firms
in countries with stricter debt enforcement. Column 3 reports the same results for the pooled
OLS regression. Column 4 corrects for measurement error in Market-to-book ratio and Cash
flow-to-assets using a fifth-order cumulants estimator. In all columns, the coefficients of
Default probability and of the interaction term Default probability × Debt enforcement are
negative and statistically significant, with the exception of Default probability in columns 2
and 4.
Economically, the asset growth rate differences between firms in countries with strongest
versus weakest debt enforcement vary between 43% and 89% of the average asset growth rate
across all countries. Our estimates also suggest that Debt enforcement is associated with
Asset growth only through its interaction with the default probability—the OLS estimate of
βη is not significantly different from zero in column 3. Overall, the results in Table 5 provide
support for our hypothesis on the effects of debt enforcement on firms’ investment decisions.
4.3. Risk
Table 6 shows the estimates of the risk specification using our four different proxies for risk.
In Panel A, columns 1 to 3 show the results for Equity vol, and columns 4 to 6 for Idiosyncratic
vol. In Panel B, columns 1 to 3 report the results for total Asset vol, and columns 4 to 6
for EBITDA-to-assets vol. Across all our specifications, we find that Default probability and
the interaction between Default probability and Debt enforcement have a positive coefficient,
irrespective of the risk proxy. Except for the specification in column 4 of Panel B, the estimates
are all statistically significant. As with investment and asset growth, our measure of debt
enforcement explains a large proportion of the covariation between risk variables and the
probability of default. Additionally, the OLS estimates of the correlation between risk and
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Debt enforcement when Default probability equals zero are not statistically different from zero
for all risk variables but EBITDA-to-assets vol.
Insert Table 6 Here
In terms of economic significance, the difference between the average Equity vol of a firm
with high default probability (i.e., higher than the third quartile breakpoint of the estimation
sample), in a country where the Debt enforcement index equals one and the Equity vol of a
similar firm in a country where the Debt enforcement index equals zero ranges between 35%
and 44% of the average Equity vol. We find similarly strong economic magnitudes for Asset
vol and Idiosyncratic vol. In the following, we only report results based on Equity vol and
Idiosyncratic vol. We obtain similar results when using Asset vol or EBITDA-to-assets vol.
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) find that stronger creditor rights reduce corporate
risk taking by estimating the correlation between the ex ante protection of creditor rights,
as measured by the index of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and
corporate risk, as measured by firms’ cash flow variability and risk-reducing investments such
as diversifying acquisitions. Our findings that Debt enforcement increases the sensitivity of
firm risk to its default probability are obtained using an index of creditor rights that reflects
how the law is expected to be enforced in practice, as opposed to how it is written on the
books, and proxies of firm risk based on the market price of equity. Section 6.1 discusses in
more detail the difference between the two indices of creditor rights.
5. Bankruptcy code reforms
In this section, we exploit the reforms to the bankruptcy codes in different countries to
compare the behavior of firms before and after such changes using a difference-in-differences
analysis. First, we test our theory using the bankruptcy law changes that affected debt
enforcement by easing the renegotiability of debt in our sample of countries between 2000 and
2010: the reforms of France, Italy, and Brazil in 2005. Second, we test the theory outside our
sample period with a well known major change to the renegotiability of debt in the U.S.: the
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1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. The goal of these additional tests is to verify the cross-country
results in a setting that, by design, reduces the concern that our results may be driven by
unobserved country characteristics.
5.1. Bankruptcy code reforms in France, Italy, and Brazil
While there are a few bankruptcy law reforms during our sample period, most of these
reforms do not change provisions in the bankruptcy code related to the enforcement of debt
contracts. They have much broader scope and typically aim at improving the overall efficiency
of the bankruptcy procedure.14
We are able to identify three bankruptcy code reforms in our sample of 41 countries that
change debt enforcement by easing the renegotiability of debt: France, Italy, and Brazil.15 In
2005, France added to its bankruptcy law a reorganization procedure inspired by the U.S.’s
Chapter 11 (“Sauvegarde de l’entreprise”). The main change was to allow management to
retain control of the distressed company, and the goal was to facilitate debt renegotiations,
explicitly recognizing that creditors may benefit from transferring some value and control to
managers and shareholders (Weber, 2005).
As in France, the reform in Italy in 2005 aimed at facilitating debt renegotiations while
protecting debtors (see Rodano, Serrano-Velarde, and Tarantino, 2016). Rodano et al. (2016)
show that the value of debt restructured in- or out-of-court significantly increased after this
reform was passed. Similarly, Brazil’s new bankruptcy law in 2005 was inspired by Chapters 7
and 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code [see Alencar and Ponticelli (2016) for a detailed discussion].
The new law introduced automatic stay on all litigations against the debtor and made it
easier for debtors to initiate debt renegotiation. While the overall reform was much broader,
it arguably also weakened debt enforcement.
14Examples are the reforms undertaken in Poland between 2004 to 2007, which involved changes to improve
the operations of the courts, or in Peru in 2006, which expanded the pool of assets usable as collateral.
15According to Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), Spain and Russia had bankruptcy reforms in 2004
that increased the creditor rights index by one point. As for Poland, the reforms affected many dimensions of
the bankruptcy code. Hence, we exclude these two countries from the following analysis.
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For each country, we focus on the behavior of firms from three years before to three
years after each reform, that is, we use yearly observations from 2002 to 2008. Following
the predictions of the model, we expect that firms with a high default probability modify
their investment and risk after the reform, while firms with a low default probability do not
change investment and risk. Therefore, we distinguish between firms that should be affected
by the reform and firms that should not be affected by conditioning on the firm’s default
probability before the reform. We define the variable High default probabilityi that equals one
if the firm’s default probability at the end of 2002 is above the second tercile breakpoint of
the country’s distribution. High default probabilityi equals zero for all firms below the first
tercile breakpoint of the 2002 default probability distribution.16 In the empirical model, we
can think of firms with a high default probability as firms treated by the reform, while the
low default probability firms are the control firms.
To study the effects of the reforms on investment, asset growth, and risk, we estimate the
following differences-in-differences specification:
Dependent variablei,t = αi + δt + βControl ×Controlsi,t−1
+ βPD × POST× High default probabilityi + εi,t.
(8)
The dependent variable in Eq. (8) is Investment, Asset growth, or either of the risk measures.
POST equals zero until 2004 and one thereafter, indicating that debt becomes more easily
renegotiable. A POST dummy equal to one is thus consistent with a lower value of Debt
enforcement in our previous tests. The parameter of interest is βPD, which measures the
average change in investment, asset growth, or risk of firms with a high default probability
after the bankruptcy code reforms (the treatment group), relative to firms with a low default
probability (the control group). Given that debt is easier to renegotiate after each reform, we
predict that βPD should be positive for investment and asset growth and negative for risk.
Since firms may not be randomly assigned to the exposure groups, we control for the same
time-varying observable firm characteristics as in the main specification (6). We also include
16The results are quantitatively similar if we split the sample at the median or at the first and third quartile
breakpoints. The results are also similar if we only include observations from 2003 to 2007, i.e., if we perform
the tests using data that start two years before and end two years after the reform.
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firm fixed effects (αi) to absorb time-invariant differences across firms and year fixed effects
(δt) to control for time-varying factors common to all firms. Finally, we cluster standard errors
at the firm level because firms’ investment and risk choices may be correlated over time.
Insert Table 7 Here
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 show that the coefficient estimate
of POST×High default probability is statistically and economically significant. Economically,
high default probability firms increase their investment rates by 1.6 to 1.7 percentage points
after the reforms relative to low default probability firms. Similarly, asset growth rates of
high default probability firms increase on average by 8.0 to 11.9 percentage points compared
to those of low default probability firms (columns 3 and 4). Finally, columns 5 to 8 show that
equity volatility and idiosyncratic volatility decrease after the reform for firms with a high
default probability relative to those with a low default probability. In all cases, the coefficient
estimates of POST× High default probabilityi are statistically and economically significant.17
That is, our main theoretical predictions are also supported for the cases in our sample where
bankruptcy laws changed to increase the renegotiability of debt.
Insert Figure 1 Here
The core assumption to identify the treatment effect in a differences-in-differences regres-
sion is that, in the absence of treatment, there is no pre-existing differential trend between
treated and control firms. Any difference in observed trends after treatment are assumed
to arise because of treatment. Fig. 1 plots the year-by-year difference in investment, asset
growth, and risk between high and low default probability firms relative to the year 2002
(event year −3). The figure shows that before the bankruptcy reforms in 2005 (event year
0), the average differences in investment, asset growth, and risk between high and low default
probability firms are not statistically different from those in 2002 (year t− 3), suggesting that
17We have also performed this analysis using a continuous measure of default probability, as done in Tables
4, 5, and 6. We obtain similar results.
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trends in outcomes for treatment and control groups prior to treatment were the same, consis-
tent with the parallel trends assumption. We only observe statistically significant differential
investment rates, asset growth, and risk after the bankruptcy reform.
5.2. The US Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
In the U.S., the Bankruptcy Reform Act (BRA) made three major changes to Chapter
11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code, starting in October 1979 (see Hackbarth, Haselman, and
Schoenherr, 2015). First, it imposed court-mandated reorganizations (‘cramdowns’) in case of
disagreement by shareholders and creditors (White, 1989; and Klee, 1979). Second, it lifted
the insolvency requirement to file for a reorganization. Third, it decreased the proportion of
votes needed to approve a reorganization plan. Overall, the BRA made debt renegotiations
more attractive to creditors and shareholders, as the threat of voluntary Chapter 11 filing be-
came a strategic tool for shareholders to extract rents from creditors. As a result, shareholders
of financially distressed firms achieved higher concessions from creditors in out-of-court re-
structurings (Franks and Torous, 1994), as well as higher deviations from the Absolute Priority
Rule in Chapter 11 (see Franks and Torous, 1989; Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt, 1990).
Further, equity returns decreased because of a lower required distress premium (Hackbarth,
Haselmann, and Schoenherr, 2015).
The BRA is also well suited to test our hypotheses because it was designed to encourage
debt renegotiation and shifted the bargaining power in reorganizations towards shareholders.
Moreover, this well known reform allows us to validate our main results in a different sample
period, while keeping the other institutional characteristics constant.
We conduct a differences-in-differences analysis around the BRA as for the reforms in
France, Italy, and Brazil. We include in the analysis three years before and three years after
the reform year 1979, i.e., the years from 1976 to 1982. All variables are defined and computed
as in the cross-country analysis, except that we use Compustat data because Worldscope’s
coverage starts only in 1990. The reform indicator POST equals zero until 1978 and one
thereafter indicating easier renegotiability of debt. High default probabilityi equals one if the
firm’s default probability at the end of 1976 is above the second tercile breakpoint of the 1976
(pre-reform) distribution, and zero if it is below the first tercile breakpoint.
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As shown in Panel B of Table 7, investment and asset growth increase while risk decreases
post-BRA for firms with a high default probability relative to firms with a low default proba-
bility. All coefficients are statistically and economically significant. We obtain similar results
when using a continuous measure of default probability, as in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
Insert Figure 2 Here
As done for the reforms in France, Italy, and Brazil, Fig. 2 plots the year-by-year difference
in investment, asset growth, and risk between high and low default probability firms for the
BRA relative to the year 1976. The figure shows that high and low default probability firms
have similar changes in investment rates, asset growth, and risk before the BRA, and that
these changes only start diverging post-BRA.
6. Robustness analysis
6.1. Ex ante creditor rights and debt enforcement
A large empirical literature, surveyed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008),
studies the effects of creditor protection on corporate investment and financing policies. Most
papers in this literature measure the variation in creditor protection across countries with the
creditor rights index of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 1998). The
LLSV index varies from 0 (weakest) to 4 (strongest) and aggregates four binary indicators
of the power of creditors in bankruptcy to (i) approve a debtor’s filing for reorganization;
(ii) seize collateral after a reorganization petition is approved; (iii) be paid first out of the
liquidation proceeds; and (iv) replace the incumbent manager during the reorganization.
The Debt enforcement index used in our empirical analysis differs from the LLSV index
because it builds on the detailed narratives provided by law practitioners in the DHMS survey
about the debt enforcement procedure that is actually used in each country. As such, our
index suffers less from the common criticism to the LLSV index, that the strength of creditor
rights in bankruptcy is best measured by how the law is expected to be enforced in practice,
as opposed to how it is written on the books.
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For example, with reference to the measurement of creditor rights in India, Vig (2013)
writes “Although India ranks quite high in terms of the LLSV creditor rights index and
attains a maximum score of 4, the enforcement of creditor rights has been seen as a major
impediment to lending in India. Historically, the judicial process was extremely rigid, marked
by bureaucratic delays, and it took a long time before creditors could access collateral.” In
our sample of countries, the correlation between the Debt enforcement index and the LLSV
index is about 0.40. Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, and USA have a debt enforcement
index above the sample median and a LLSV index below the sample median. In contrast,
Germany, Denmark, Korea, the Netherlands, and South Africa have a debt enforcement index
below the sample median, and a LLSV index above the sample median.
To test our claim that what matters for investment and risk choices is debt enforcement
in default, Table 8 reports the estimates of our benchmark investment, asset growth, and risk
regressions using the LLSV index of creditor rights instead of our index of Debt enforcement. If
our results were driven by cross-country differences in the ex ante protection of creditor rights,
rather that frictions in the enforceability of debt contracts in default, we would expect the
interaction between Default probability and the LLSV creditor rights index (Creditor rights)
to be correlated with the firms’ investment and risk variables across countries.
Insert Table 8 Here
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 8 show that this is not the case: controlling for country and
industry fixed effects, firms’ investment and risk are significantly related to firms’ default
probability. However, the interaction of Default probability with Creditor rights is never sta-
tistically significant, suggesting that the relation between investment or risk and the default
probability is not significantly related to cross-country differences in the LLSV index of ex
ante protection of creditor rights. The results reported in these columns are robust to using
alternative fixed effects estimators.
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6.2. Extended debt enforcement index
Our tests so far use a measure of debt enforcement based on the 16 characteristics out
of 24 reported in the DHMS survey that, according to Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012),
are clear indicators of whether debt can be successfully renegotiated. In this section, we
test the robustness of our results to using an extended debt enforcement index that also
includes the remaining eight characteristics from the DHMS survey. As with the original Debt
enforcement index, each additional binary indicator in the extended index takes a value of one
if it strengthens debt enforcement. Appendix B.2 describes these variables and the extended
index in detail.
Insert Table 9 Here
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 9 show the estimates of our benchmark investment and risk
regressions when using the extended debt enforcement index. We obtain the same qualitative
results as before, if quantitatively stronger.
6.3. Other robustness checks
Columns 5 to 8 of Table 9 show the estimates of our benchmark investment and risk
regressions using a subsample that excludes U.S. and Japanese firms. The results are not
affected by the exclusion of such firms, even though they account for almost 30% of the firms
in the sample.
In additional unreported tests we replace the firm’s Default probability measure, which is
Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) approximation of the Merton distance-to-default model, with
the Altman’s Z -score. We obtain similar results.
7. Conclusion
We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces
shareholder-debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less
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risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms
from 41 countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics. We find that debt
renegotiation frictions that strengthen the enforcement of debt contracts relate to investment
and firm risk through their interactions with the firm-specific probability of default. The
results suggest that the possibility of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts, which likely
increases shareholders’ expected recovery in default, decreases the underinvestment and asset
substitution distortions caused by agency conflicts near insolvency.
Previous literature has found that some forms of strengthening of creditor rights may lead
to smaller debt overhang distortions near default. Our study shows that these distortions may
also be mitigated by a weakening of the enforceability of debt contracts in default. There are
two take-aways from our analysis. First, the policy choices of firms near default depend on the
different ways creditor rights may be enforced in practice. Second, the relative benefits and
costs of pro-creditor and pro-debtor approaches to bankruptcy regulation, and their effects on
investment policy, should be studied in future research.
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Appendix A. Data set
We start with all the countries in the DHMS survey that are also covered by Worldscope,
Capital IQ, and Datastream. For every firm in each country, we download annual accounting
variables, in USD, from Worldscope, and weekly and daily price data, in USD, from Datas-
tream. For U.S. firms, we download price data from CRSP. We match the firm-level data
with several country-specific institutional variables that come from the World Bank. We drop
some countries because of the low number of observations (Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt,
and Venezuela), and because the institutional variables are not available (India, Pakistan, and
Zimbabwe). We also drop firm-years with negative or zero total assets or sales, and firm-years
for which the (absolute value of) negative EBITDA is larger than total assets, as in Bris,
Koskinen, and Nilsson (2009). The results do not depend on this exclusion because it involves
very few firm-years. We end up with a sample of firms from 41 countries, including all Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), some Latin American, Middle
Eastern, and Asian countries. Our panel is unbalanced because we do not require that the
firms exist for the whole sample period.
Appendix B. Debt enforcement index
B.1. Baseline debt enforcement index
The construction of the Debt enforcement index follows the paper by Favara, Schroth, and
Valta (2012) and is based on the DHMS survey data. The individual data items are available
on Andrei Shleifer’s web page. The index measures the degree of enforcement of debt contracts
in default and is based on 16 individual indicators. The measure of debt enforcement in the
model is a continuous measure that takes values between zero and one. Accordingly, the Debt
enforcement index is the average of the following non-missing binary (zero if no, one if yes)
indicators where the variable names in parentheses correspond to the names in the DHMS
data set (when a variable X decreases debt enforcement, we take 1−X):
1. Out of court seizure and sale: Secured creditors may seize and sell their collateral without
court approval (ooc);
2. No judge for enforcement: Secured creditors may enforce their security either in or out
of court (sumjud);
3. Floating charge: The entire business’s assets can be pledged as collateral (floating);
4. Case proceeds on appeal of insolvency: An insolvency order cannot be appealed at all
(apporde);
5. Case proceeds on appeal of liquidation: A liquidation order cannot be appealed at all
(appsal);
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6. Case proceeds on claim amount dispute: An insolvency case is suspended until the
resolution of the appeal (1-disclai);
7. Reorganization attempt required: The firm may enter liquidation without attempting
reorganization (1-attemreo);
8. Automatic trigger for liquidation: An automatic trigger mechanism can initiate insol-
vency (trigliq);
9. Automatic stay on enforcement: Secured creditors may enforce their security upon com-
mencement of the insolvency proceedings (1-scsstay);
10. Automatic stay on lawsuits: Secured creditors may enforce their security in lawsuits
(1-lawsc);
11. Firm must cease operating: A defaulting firm must cease operations upon commence-
ment of insolvency proceedings (opceas);
12. Management remains: Management does not remain in control of decisions during in-
solvency proceedings (1-mancont);
13. Creditor approves administrator: Secured creditors have the right to approve the ap-
pointment of the insolvency administrator (whoapp);
14. Creditor dismisses administrator: Secured creditors may dismiss the insolvency admin-
istrator (dismiss);
15. Creditor vote directly: Secured creditors vote directly on the reorganization plan (scvot-
dir);
16. Proof of reorganization prospects: Firm must submit proof of reorganization prospects
before reorganization proceedings may commence (proofreo).
B.2. Additional characteristics from the DHMS survey and extended index
Our baseline Debt enforcement index is based on 16 individual indicators, out of 24 in-
dicators reported by DHMS. This baseline index does not include all 24 indicators, as for
eight of them it was not clear to us whether they made debt enforcement in default easier
or more difficult. In a robustness test, we use an extended debt enforcement index that also
includes the following (remaining) characteristics from the DHMS survey, in addition to the
16 individual indicators of our baseline Debt enforcement index.
1. Statutory time limits on appeals: Time limits on appeals are probably good for creditors
to enforce their claim (apptime);
2. Restrictions on dismissals: The firm is not restricted from dismissing employees upon
initiation of insolvency proceedings (empres);
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3. Contracts may be rescinded: Suppliers and customers may rescind contracts without
penalty upon initiation of insolvency proceedings (supresc);
4. Specialized court: The authority with jurisdiction is either a specialized bankruptcy
court or a specialized bankruptcy administrative authority (spec);
5. Administrator paid on market value: The insolvency admministrator is remunerated
based on the market value of the insolvency estate (mktval);
6. Same judge for claim amount dispute: An appeal of the amount of the claim is handled
by the same judge supervising the insolvency case (disju);
7. Same judge for appeal of insolvency: An appeal of the initiation of the insolvency case
is handled by the same judge supervising the insolvency case (orderju);
8. Same judge for appeal of liquidation: An appeal of the order to liquidate is handled by
the same judge supervising the insolvency case (saleju).
Some of these variables are difficult to classify as pro-debtor or pro-creditor, for example,
those related to judges. Results are similar if we exclude the last three indicators from the
list above.
Appendix C. Debt enforcement and risk taking without investment
Suppose now that there is no investment opportunity but that shareholders can increase
risk after debt has been issued. In this case, equity value is given by
E(V0;D) = p
2(z2V0 −D) + 2p (1− p) (V0 −D) + (1− p)2 (1− η) z−2V0.
Using the definition of the risk-neutral probability of an increase in asset value, we have that:
∂E(V0;D)
∂z
=
2 [Dz + ηV0]
(1 + z)3
> 0, (C.1)
in the low leverage case so that:
∂2E(V0;D)
∂z∂η
=
2V0
(1 + z)3
> 0. (C.2)
Simple calculations also show that we have
∂2E(V0;D)
∂z∂η
=
2zV0
(1 + z)3
> 0,
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in the high leverage case so that
∂2E(V0;D)
∂z∂η
∂2E(V0;D)
∂z∂η
=
2zV0
(1+z)3
2V0
(1+z)3
= z > 1.
As in the case with investment, debt enforcement has a greater effect on risk-shifting incentives
when default risk is larger.
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Fig. 1. Bankruptcy reforms in Italy, France, and Brazil. The graph presents the average
difference in Investment, Asset growth, Equity volatility, and Idiosyncratic volatility between
high and low default probability firms, conditioning on firm and year fixed effects and control
variables. The sample period is from 2002 to 2008. The event year 0 corresponds to the
bankruptcy reform year in 2005. The point estimates and confidence intervals refer to the
coefficients of the interaction terms between the high default probability dummy and annual
event-time dummies around the reforms. The point estimates are relative to the year 2002,
the year in which firms are sorted in treated (high default probability) and control (low default
probability) groups.
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Fig. 2. U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act. The graph presents the average difference in Invest-
ment, Asset growth, Equity volatility, and Idiosyncratic volatility between high and low default
probability firms, conditioning on firm and year fixed effects and control variables. The sample
period is from 1976 to 1982. The event year 0 corresponds to the bankruptcy reform year in
1979. The point estimates and confidence intervals refer to the coefficients of the interaction
terms between the high default probability dummy and annual event-time dummies around
the reforms. The point estimates are relative to the year 1976, the year in which firms are
sorted in treated (high default probability) and control (low default probability) groups.
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Table 1
Definitions of variables
Variable name Variable definition Source
Investment Capital expenditures in year t / Total assets in year t− 1 Worldscope
Asset growth Growth in total assets from year t− 1 to year t Worldscope
Equity vol Annualized standard deviation of weekly stock returns Worldscope /
(Friday-to-Friday) in year t, as in Bartram, Brown, Datastream
and Stulz (2012)
Idiosyncratic vol Annualized standard deviation of the residuals from the Worldscope /
regression of the firm’s weekly stock returns in year t Datastream
on the world market index (lag, lead, and contemporaneous)
EBITDA-to-assets vol Standard deviation of the ratio of EBITDA to assets between Worldscope
the years t− 7 and t, as in John, Litov, and Yeung (2008)
Default probability (DP) Default probability estimate, using Bharath and Worldscope /
Shumway’s (2008) approximation of the Merton Datastream
Distance-to-Default (DD) model
Asset vol Average of equity and debt yearly volatilities (% per year) Worldscope /
from weekly stock prices, weighted by debt face values Datastream
and market equity values, as in Bharath and Shumway (2008)
Debt enforcement (η) Index of debt enforcement in default, constructed using the Djankov
survey data in Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008) et al. (2008)
Leverage Total debt / Total assets Worldscope
Long-term debt Long-term debt / Total debt Capital IQ
Market-to-book ratio (Total assets + market cap - book equity) / Total assets Worldscope
Cash flow-to-assets (Net income + Depreciation & amortization) / Total assets Worldscope
EBITDA-to-assets Ratio of EBITDA to total assets Worldscope
log(Total assets) Logarithm of total assets Worldscope
log(GDP per capita) Logarithm of gross national income per capita World Bank
GDP growth Annual gross domestic product growth World Bank
Stockmarket cap to GDP Ratio of the country’s total stock market capitalization to World Bank
the total gross national income
Creditor rights La Porta et al.’s (1998) country-specific index of creditors’ La Porta
rights; ranges from 0 to 4 et al. (1998)
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Table 3
Firm characteristics
This table presents descriptive statistics (number of firm-year observations, N; mean; stan-
dard deviation, decomposed into between-firm, sdb, and within-firm, sdw, variation; and the three
quartiles: p25, p50, and p75) of the variables used in the analysis. The sample contains firm-year ob-
servations from the Worldscope and Capital IQ databases between 2000–2010 that could be matched
to the countries surveyed by Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008). Please refer to Table 1
for a definition of these variables.
Standard deviation
N Mean Total sdb sdw p25 p50 p75
Investment 113,598 0.056 0.070 0.061 0.046 0.014 0.034 0.070
Asset growth 114,559 0.092 0.257 0.181 0.221 −0.047 0.061 0.184
Equity vol 113,950 0.518 0.307 0.288 0.204 0.316 0.441 0.625
Idiosyncratic vol 112,948 0.471 0.290 0.276 0.190 0.282 0.397 0.568
EBITDA-to-assets vol 93,671 0.063 0.060 0.066 0.025 0.025 0.043 0.077
Default probability 112,337 0.339 0.345 0.211 0.300 0.004 0.217 0.658
Asset vol 113,754 0.404 0.239 0.232 0.155 0.249 0.341 0.484
Leverage 114,559 0.257 0.180 0.170 0.088 0.111 0.239 0.371
Long-term debt 86,683 0.561 0.315 0.281 0.174 0.294 0.586 0.846
Market-to-book ratio 114,557 1.430 1.005 0.979 0.598 0.904 1.136 1.580
Cash flow-to-assets ratio 111,517 0.068 0.118 0.121 0.075 0.028 0.071 0.123
EBITDA-to-assets 112,353 0.085 0.130 0.136 0.082 0.045 0.094 0.147
log(Total assets) 114,559 5.464 1.809 1.792 0.377 4.215 5.323 6.599
log(GDP per capita) 114,062 9.812 1.093 1.061 0.225 9.033 10.380 10.583
GDP growth 114,491 0.035 0.041 0.035 0.025 0.014 0.029 0.052
Stockmarket cap to GDP 107,848 1.090 0.820 0.771 0.298 0.663 0.995 1.296
Creditor rights 114,559 2.212 1.106 1.109 0.106 1.000 2.000 3.000
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Table 4
Debt enforcement and capital investment
This table presents industry and country fixed effects (ICFE), firm fixed effects (FFE), OLS,
and fifth-order linear cumulant (LC5) estimates of investment regressions. The sample contains firm-
year observations from the Worldscope and Capital IQ databases between 2000–2010 that could be
matched to the countries surveyed by Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008). The dependent
variable is yearly Investment. All specifications include year fixed effects. The coefficient on Default
probability reports the conditional correlation between Investment and Default probability evaluated
at the sample mean of Debt enforcement. Standard errors (in parentheses under each estimate)
are clustered by country. The ρ2 statistic is the coefficient of determination for the LC5 estimator,
excluding the variation determined by country and industry fixed effects. Estimates followed by the
symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, or ∗ are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively. Please
refer to Table 1 for a definition of all the variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification ICFE FFE OLS LC5
Default probability (DP) −0.003∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
DP × Debt enforcement −0.008∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Debt enforcement (η) 0.005
(0.006)
Market-to-book ratio 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash flow-to-assets 0.172∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.011)
EBITDA-to-assets −0.045∗∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.049∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
log(Total assets) −0.001∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth 0.044 0.024 0.121∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.041) (0.015)
log(GDP per capita) −0.000 0.006 −0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.374)
Stockmarket cap to GDP 0.003 0.002 −0.002 0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 102,239 102,239 102,239 102,239
R2 0.25 0.53 0.10
ρ2 0.06
Economic significance : ∆E(y) ≡ E(y|η = 0, .)− E(y|η = 1, .)
∆E(Investment) 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.004 0.009∗∗∗
Standard error (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
∆E(Investment)
mean Investment 0.143 0.144 0.085 0.174
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Table 5
Debt enforcement and asset growth
This table presents industry and country fixed effects (ICFE), firm fixed effects (FFE), OLS, and
fifth-order linear cumulant (LC5) estimates of asset growth regressions. The sample contains firm-
year observations from the Worldscope and Capital IQ databases between 2000–2010 that could be
matched to the countries surveyed by Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008). The dependent
variable is Asset growth. All specifications include year fixed effects. The coefficient on Default
probability reports the conditional correlation between Asset growth and Default probability evaluated
at the sample mean of Debt enforcement. Standard errors (in parentheses under each estimate) are
clustered by country. The ρ2 statistic is the coefficient of determination for the LC5 estimator,
excluding the variation determined by country and industry fixed effects. Estimates followed by the
symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, or ∗ are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively. Please
refer to Table 1 for a definition of all the variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification ICFE FFE OLS LC5
Default probability (DP) −0.036∗∗ −0.013 −0.042∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.003)
DP × Debt enforcement −0.057∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.051∗ −0.064∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.011)
Debt enforcement (η) 0.017
(0.019)
Market-to-book ratio 0.043∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Cash flow-to-assets 0.393∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.039) (0.042) (0.072)
EBITDA-to-assets −0.002 0.114∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.086
(0.025) (0.029) (0.032) (0.061)
log(Total assets) −0.006∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.001)
GDP growth 0.782∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.244) (0.145) (0.060)
log(GDP per capita) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.003 0.036∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.040) (0.006) (0.007)
Stockmarket cap to GDP 0.035∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.004 0.025∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 103,028 103,028 103,028 103,028
R2 0.15 0.41 0.13
ρ2 0.14
Economic significance : ∆E(y) ≡ E(y|η = 0, .)− E(y|η = 1, .)
∆E(Asset growth) 0.049∗∗ 0.046∗ 0.027 0.055∗∗∗
Standard error (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.010)
∆E(Asset growth)
mean Asset growth 0.787 0.754 0.433 0.888
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Table 6
Debt enforcement and risk
This table presents industry and country fixed effects (ICFE), firm fixed effects (FFE), and OLS estimates
of risk regressions. The sample contains firm-year observations from the Worldscope and Capital IQ databases
between 2000–2010 that could be matched to the countries surveyed by Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer
(2008). The dependent variable is Equity vol in columns 1 to 3 of Panel A, Idiosyncratic vol in columns 4 to
6 of Panel A, total implied Asset vol in columns 1 to 3 of Panel B, and EBITDA-to-assets vol in columns 4
to 6 of Panel B. All specifications include year fixed effects. The coefficient on Default probability reports the
conditional correlation between the dependent variable and Default probability evaluated at the sample mean
of Debt enforcement. Standard errors (in parentheses under each estimate) are clustered by country. Estimates
followed by the symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, or ∗ are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively.
Please refer to Table 1 for a definition of all the variables.
Panel A
Dependent variable: Equity vol Idiosyncratic vol
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification ICFE FFE OLS ICFE FFE OLS
Default probability (DP) 0.219∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
DP × Debt enforcement 0.207∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.081) (0.067) (0.068) (0.083)
Debt enforcement −0.046 −0.059
(0.056) (0.051)
Market-to-book ratio 0.012∗∗ 0.002 0.018∗ 0.009∗ −0.003 0.013∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Cash flow-to-assets −0.185∗∗∗ −0.078 −0.194∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.047) (0.051) (0.039) (0.042) (0.049)
EBITDA-to-assets −0.362∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.059) (0.050) (0.032) (0.052) (0.045)
log(Total assets) −0.052∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004)
GDP growth 0.09 0.006 0.716 0.036 −0.051 0.729∗
(0.237) (0.281) (0.471) (0.245) (0.280) (0.388)
log(GDP per capital) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.056 0.003 0.091∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ −0.001
(0.032) (0.037) (0.023) (0.028) (0.032) (0.020)
Stockmarket cap to GDP 0.055∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.020 0.062∗∗∗ 0.049∗ 0.022∗
(0.021) (0.024) (0.014) (0.022) (0.025) (0.012)
Observations 108,700 108,700 108,700 105,111 105,111 105,111
R2 0.39 0.65 0.29 0.39 0.65 0.30
Economic significance : ∆E(y) ≡ E(y|η = 0, .)− E(y|η = 1, .)
∆E(Dependent variable) −0.177∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗
Standard error (0.057) (0.058) (0.068) (0.056) (0.057) (0.070)
∆E(Dependent variable)
mean Dependent variable −0.372 −0.353 −0.440 −0.399 −0.381 −0.466
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Table 6: continued
Panel B
Dependent variable: Asset vol EBITDA-to-assets vol
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification ICFE FFE OLS ICFE FFE OLS
Default probability (DP) 0.059∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
DP × Debt enforcement 0.095∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.006 0.005∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.038) (0.042) (0.044) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Debt enforcement (η) −0.038 0.021∗∗
(0.044) (0.010)
Market-to-book ratio 0.028∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Cash flow-to-assets 0.043 0.027 0.042 0.047∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗
(0.031) (0.035) (0.030) (0.013) (0.007) (0.021)
EBITDA-to-assets −0.391∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ −0.389∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.044) (0.045) (0.013) (0.010) (0.024)
log(Total assets) −0.042∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growth 0.300 0.191 0.797∗∗ 0.024 0.024 −0.051
(0.200) (0.217) (0.341) (0.034) (0.024) (0.117)
log(GDP per capital) 0.049∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Stockmarket cap to GDP 0.054∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.023∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.001 0.002
(0.021) (0.023) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 108,700 108,700 108,700 79,830 79,830 79,830
R2 0.36 0.64 0.26 0.33 0.84 0.21
Economic significance : ∆E(y) ≡ E(y|η = 0, .)− E(y|η = 1, .)
∆E(Dependent variable) −0.081∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗ −0.005 −0.004∗ −0.009∗∗∗
Standard error (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
∆E(Dependent variable)
mean Dependent variable −0.212 −0.267 −0.246 −0.099 −0.077 −0.183
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Table 8
Robustness analysis: Creditor rights, investment, and risk
The table presents industry and country fixed effects estimates of investment, asset growth,
and risk regressions. The sample contains firm-year observations from the Worldscope and Capital
IQ databases between 2000–2010 that could be matched to the countries surveyed by Djankov,
Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008). All columns include Market-to-book ratio, Cash flow-to-capital,
EBITDA-to-assets, log(Total assets), GDP growth, log(GDP per capita), and Stockmarket cap to
GDP as control variables, as well as year fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 compare the conditional
correlations between Creditor rights and Investment and Asset growth, respectively. Columns 3 and
4 compare the conditional correlations between Creditor rights and risk. The coefficient on Default
probability reports the conditional correlation between the dependent variable and Default probability
evaluated at the sample mean of Creditor rights. Standard errors (in parentheses under each estimate)
are clustered by country. Estimates followed by the symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, or ∗ are statistically significant
at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Table 1 for a definition of all the variables.
Dependent variable Investment Asset Equity Idiosyncratic
growth vol vol
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default probability (DP) −0.003∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022)
DP × Creditor rights (CR) 0.001 −0.001 0.012 0.016
(0.001) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 102,239 103,028 108,700 105,111
R2 0.25 0.15 0.39 0.38
Economic significance : ∆E(y) ≡ E(y|CR = 0, .)− E(y|CR = 4, .)
∆E(Dependent variable) −0.002 0.024 −0.041 −0.055
Standard error (0.004) (0.037) (0.045) (0.037)
∆E(Dependent variable)
mean Dependent variable −0.039 0.624 −0.065 −0.097
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